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Open defiance 
in East Timor and West Papua 
The1·e has been open defiance of the Indonesian forces of occupation in both West Papua and 
East Timor. Man.v hundreds demonstrated in Jayapura on 14 December, in support of the 1988 
proclamation of a West Melanesian state. Several hundred were arrested. [See page 10.] 
In Dili, the first act of defiance occurred when people unfurled pro-independence banners 
at the Pope's mass last October. Since then, young people have acted defiantly on several 
occasions, culminating in a successful bid to meet the US ambassador in Dili on 17 January. 
Two deaths reported 
At midday on Wednesday, 17 January 1990, about a 
hundred young people carrying banners calling for 
'Peace, Justice and' Independence for East Timor', 
'Independence or Dead', and 'Integration No', con-
verged on Hotel Tourismo shortly after John Monjo, 
the US ambassador, had checked in. Details of what 
happened next have been made available in sworn 
affidavits of two Australian tourists, John Andrew 
McMillan, a writer from Darwin, and Jennifer Groves, 
a school-teacher, who were in the hotel beer garden 
at the time, discussing their travel plans in East 
Timor with a tourism official. 
The demonstrators, many wearing masks, went up-
stairs to A-wing and occupied the balcony, cha.Sed by 
soldiers with rifles. The students started throwing 
stones at the soldiers below who threw the stones 
back at them. Three other students who ran into the 
beer garden were dragged away, kicked and punched. 
.At this point, the two witnesses took refuge in the 
hotel entrance and saw dozens of soldiers and police 
taking up ]positions in the street outside. Andrew 
went to his room for his camera and tape-recorder. 
When he returned, the ambassador and his aides 
were conversing with the students through mega-
phones. Another Australian tourist who understood 
Indonesian told them that the demonstrators were 
telling the ambassador about human rights abuses and 
calling for UN intervention in East Timor. They said 
they would be persecuted or killed for demonstrating 
in this way. This went on for about an hour, while 
Indonesian officials cooperated with the ambassador, 
as if free speech is a right in East Timor. 
As riot police with shields and batons lined up on 
either side of the hotel, plainclothes men video-taped, 
recorded and photographed the students, and took a 
photo of the two eye witnesses. But they also man-
aged to photographs as well. After the talks ended, 
the demonstrators asked the US diplomat to secure 
safe passage for them. When the ambassador left by 
car to meet the governor at about 1.45 pm, demonstr-
ators . surged beside and behind his car for protec-. 
tion. But as the car drew away, the police and sol-
diers charged into the demonstrators, beating them 
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with batons and rifle butts. 
A human pile 
By now they were all on the street in front of the 
hotel· some managed to escape while the remainder, 
about forty, were clubbed and beaten into a human 
pile against the hotel fence. Many were bleeding and 
in shock. Some scaled the fence, seeking refuge with 
five tourists and two diplomats who were sheltering 
at the hotel entrance, but they were chased, kicked 
and beaten with M-16 rifles. 
As the students in the pile prayed, some crying, 
plainclothes officers dumped buckets of sand on pools 
of blood in the road. The two eye witnesses both 
testify to seeing a limp body thrown on a truck, with 
a red rag over his face. Police who climbed onto the 
truck kicked the body which did not respond. 
At this point, as soldiers stood back, restrained by 
their officers who were aware that foreigners were 
present. an International Red Cross worker moved in. 
The students disentangled themselves from the pile 
and straggled to Bishop Belo•s house, two doors away. 
Many were crying and streaming with blood. One 
student threw a blood-stained T-shirt to the on-
lookers but this was grabbed by an official. By 2.10 
pm, the streets were empty. 
Back in the beer garden, the two witnesses were 
joined by two of the ambassador•s entourage who had 
not accompanied him to the governor's office. They 
had seen the incident and also heard from the Austr-
alians what they had seen. Later, the tourists were 
told by a Catholic aid agency worker that two demon-
strators had died. One was the man whose body had 
been thrown onto the truck; the other was a young 
man who died in the Red Cross building across the 
road from the hotel. He had stumbled in through the 
back door. then collapsed and reportedly died on the 
floor, after spitting up blood. Soldiers followed him 
into the building and dragged his body away. 
After the incident. Jennifer hurried to her room and 
concealed her role of film; she had taken 37 shots. 
The next day they left the country, fearing trouble 
as they had been photographed by officials. Back in 
Darwin. they were interviewed by the press l Weekend 
Australian. 20-21 January], On 23 January, they made 
sworn statements before a Commissioner of Oaths. 
Two other Australian tourists. Justin Winning, a 
mine-worker from Pine Creek, and a freelance photo-
grapher who refused to give her name, also saw the 
incident and later gave their account to a Sunday 
newspaper in Darwin. The details are largely the 
A human mound of Timorese students 
surrounded by soldiers and riot 
police . The scene outside the 
Hotel Toursimo minutes after the 
US ambassador left, [Weekend 
Australian, 20-21 January, 1990] 
same, except that Winning thought 
he saw two bodies thrown onto the 
truck. He said: 
They were just pleading for the 
ambassador to do something for 
their cause. They knew full well 
that through demonstrating like 
this, they were going to get it in 
the neck from officials. When the 
ambassador went to leave, they 
were pleading with him not to. As 
soon as he did, the military got 
stuck into them with rifle butts, 
booting them and using batons .... I 
was just aghast. /Sunday Territor-
ian, 21 January 1990. 
200 demonstrate the next day 
Far from being cowed by army brutality, a crowd of 
youngsters went on the streets again the very next 
day to demonstrate outside the governor's office, 
calling for independence and declaring that they were 
supporters of the outlawed Fretilin resistance. LReut-
er. 19 January 1990J Reuter quoted its source as 
saying: "Things are getting hot in Dili." 
Ambassador Monjo hides the tacts 
The report about the 17 January demonstration in Dili 
was first picked up by foreign press agencies in 
Jakarta who quoted a US embassy spokesperson as 
saying Ambassador Monjo had a one-hour 'grievance 
session' with demonstrators in Dili and later asked the 
authorities not to arrest or detain any of the protes-
tors as their demonstration was peaceful; the embassy 
added that, up to the ambassador9s departure. there 
had been no arrests. Considering that embassy staff 
witnessed the army's violent crackdown inside and 
outside the hotel, the embassy's account can only be 
described as a deliberate distortion. It may well be 
that Monjo was visiting East Timor to repudiate 
concerns recently expressed by members of the US 
Congress. In this context, the demonstration to greet 
the US ambassador was particularly well-chosen and 
is bound to increase pressure on Washington. 
114 Congress members concerned 
Last December, a bipartisan group of 114 members 
of the House of Representatives wrote to Secretary of 
State James Baker, expressing concern at reported 
arrests of as many as forty people following the 
Pope's visit to East Timor. They expressed concern 
a.bout reports that several of those arrested were 
tortured to extra.ct 'confessions'. While such reports 
are difficult to verify, they would fall into a well-
established pattern ... of mistreatment of detainees in 
the period immediately following arrest. 
Calla tor an lnquir7 
The Jakarta-based Institute for the Defence of Human 
Rights told the armed forces commander. Gen. Try 
Soetrisno in a letter on 24 January it had been told 
of 'at least three deaths' in Dili the previous week; 
six people who sought refuge in the Bishop•s home 
had since been arrested. The Institute asked General 
Try for an explanation of the deaths and the arrests. 
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Opening up, a year on 
On 29 December 1988, East Timor was officially opened up. Much has occurred since, not least 
Bishop Belo's call for a referendum and the controversial visit of the Pope. The opening up 
remains a thorny issue for the Indonesian authorities, sometir:ies working as a boomerang. 
There is much more reporting about East Timor in the Indonesian and foreign press, making 
it possible to take a closer look at conditions there. 
The door Bll&htly ajar 
Some ABRI leaders, in particular General Murdani and 
friends, have always regarded opening up as futile 
and unnecessary; but Governor Carrascalao, Foreign 
Minister Ali Alatas and Interior Minister General 
Rudini convinced the President that it would be 
useful diplomatically, while helping to attract foreign 
and domestic capital to East Timor. None of these 
objectives appear to have been fulfilled. Indonesia's 
illegal presence in East Timor has been exposed to 
international scrutiny while capital investments have 
not materialised as no entrepreneurs want to invest 
a war-stricken region. 
Opening up meant that gradually East Timor would 
be treated as a 'normal' province under the Interior 
Ministry, not a special project of the Indonesian army. 
But clearly, this would not happen overnight. As yet, 
only 8 of the 13 subdistricts are open to outsiders. 
Anyone staying more than 24 hours in one place must 
report to the authorities (in many places there are 
signs reminding people to report to the police or 
military). There are still numerous military check-
points along the roads; between .Dili and Baucau, a 
distance of 90 kms, 8 checkpoints were reported by 
Kompas reporters who quoted police chief, Lieut. Col. 
Ramli Surbakti as saying: "Sooner or later, people will 
get used to it". 
In preparation for the Pope's visit, armed forces 
commander General Try Sutrisno promised visiting 
foreign journalists complete freedom. However, Roy 
Eccleston from the Australian wrote: 
On the road we see 14 or 15 trucks filled with 
troops. We also notice a black jeep, which keeps us in 
sight all the way back to Dili. The same car is parked 
outside the military intelligence office the next day. 
According to Louise Williams of the Sydney Morning 
Herald: 
It is here (Los Palos) we meet the 'road contrac-
tors'. A bunch of overly friendly men with short 
haircuts. The sort of characters that shake your hand 
enthusiastically and hold on too long. There is no 
hotel, no-one comes here, and at night the road 
contractors are conveniently staying in the same 
house..... Curiously the black jeep filled with the 
jovial 'road contractors' is trailing behind. By night-
fall, we seem to be playing chicken with the black 
jeep on the empt,v country road. 
Most reports confirm human rights abuses, the huge 
presence of the Indonesian military and the atmos-
phere of fear the East Timorese have to endure. 
Quoting a local priest the SMH says: "The fear here is 
if you do anything you can be detained anywhere, for 
any time. People are very much afraid to talk. They 
just say they don't know, even if they know very 
well." An estimated 12,000 to 15,000 Indonesian troops 
are permanently stationed in East Timor and another 
5,000 to 9,000 commandos are used to fight the gueril-
Indonesian soldier, posing with his faaily, outside 
army barracks in Taibisse, Dili. [Photo: Jan-Erik 
Forsberg.] 
las. The military are involved in a variety of ac-
tivities, from general security, social and construction 
work to the more specialised 'social control' of placing 
guards everywhere to catch those suspected of 
supporting the resistance. 
The pervasiveness of the military is confirmed in all 
the reports. Newsweek reporter Rod Nordland wrote: 
"Indonesians - usually army officers in civilian guise 
- occupy all key government posts, even in local 
communities. They dominate Dili's commercial life". 
Indonesia has for years applied a two-pronged 
strategy: fighting the guerillas and winning the 
hearts and minds of the people. The large number of 
.territorial troops indicates that the hearts and minds 
strategy is the main objective while KOOPSKAM, the 
special military command for East Timor (disbanded in 
December, see separate item), was assigned to fight 
the guerillas. Colonel Prabowo's assignment in East 
Timor (see TAPOL Bulletin No 96) was to draw the two 
strategies closer together. Captured guerillas are not 
immediately killed any more, but used to spread the 
propaganda that Indonesians are human rights 
champions. The captured guerillas are (mis)used as 
hostages and often required to speak to foreign 
visitors. The Australian says Catholic nuns doubt 
whether the captives are in a position to speak the • 
truth because of the threat of reprisals to relatives. 
According to the nuns, 
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'Here they are j ust instruments too. If they are 
ordered to kill, they hsve to kill. ' They go with the 
military to fight? 'They fight also', say the nuns. Do 
they ieel they ar e traitors? 'They feel they have to 
comply, they feel compelled to obey the orders ••• yes, 
they are threatened if they do not help.' 
Opening the r egion to out sider s has always been a 
double-edged weapon; those responsible for security 
are the least happy. Police Lieut. Colonel Surbakti 
argues that opening up should be done slowly. It is 
not only a matter of inviting tourists and earning 
foreign currency; other factors should also be con-
sidered such as security, politics and culture. 
The role of the church 
It is interesting to see how the role of the church is 
described. Since Bishop Bela's call for a referendum, 
relations between the church on the one hand, and 
the military and local government, have deteriorated. 
East Timorese have shown that they are prepared to 
take risks to defend the church and its leader, 
Bishop Belo. The Australian states: 
If stomachs are empty, the churches are full. 'In 
times of hardship, people turn to faith,' says another 
priest. The military realise the power of the Church. 
And the,v do not like it....... 'Ma.vbe there are Fretilin 
sympathisers in the church,' says one officer. 'Maybe 
some priests are also sympathisers.'.... In Jakarta a 
member of the Government goes further: 'Priests 
should tell the truth, but the world is full of priests 
not knee-deep, but neck-deep in politics. There is a 
small core, four or five priests of Portuguese descent 
who are violently political in East Timor'. 
This observation is confirmed in a series of articles 
in Indonesia's leading daily Kompas which .speaks of 
the church as the place where East Timorese find 
solace and protection. The role of the clergy is so 
influential that the government and military have to 
consider things very carefully. Wrong or hasty steps 
will cause the population to show their disagreement 
straight away. In other words, to approach the 
people, the two forces need to behave nicely towards 
the clergy. Loekman Soetrisno1 an Indonesian academ-
ic who has undertaken social studies in East Timor 
told a seminar in Yogyakarta recently that church 
leaders did not know how to protect the people 
without opposing the government. 
The church's role is a difficult one. The recent calls 
for independence by students at the two major 
Catholic schools, Fatumaca in Baucau and Externato 
Sao Jose in Dili, have made the military even more 
suspicious of clergy who teach at the schools. The 
recent wave of arrests mostly affected pupils from 
the two schools. [See separate item.) The priests say 
they want to educate children as good Catholics while 
Jakarta wants good Indonesians first and good Catho-
lics only second. 
As Australian journalists note, the struggle for self-
determination takes many forms and is not confined to 
the 14-year long guerilla war. Louise Williams writes: 
The battle now is for freedom of speech and the 
retention of a local identity in the face of the all-
pervasive security apparatus of the Indonesians and 
their imported Javanese ways. And behind that con-
flict lies the desperate need for economic develop-
ment. Nowadays, that much more subtle battle is being 
fought largely by the local front-line campaigners for 
human rights - the priests and nuns of the Catholic 
Church. 
Coffee and the economy 
Coffee remains the prime commodity in East Timor 
accounting for about 60% of export earnings. Accord-
ing to Indonesian statistics, about 30% of Timorese 
peasants (38,788 out of 132,137 peasant families) are 
coffee growers, mostly concentrated in Ermera, Li-
quisa and Ainaro. Coffee is grown on plots and the 
'provincial' revenue of Rp. 1.3 billion is almost all 
from the coffee tax. Thirty to 40% of all commercial 
vehicles are used to transport coffee. 
But coffee faces many problems analysed by Kompas. 
In spite of more acreage, production is falling. In 
1984, 8,600 tons (from 47,648 ha) were produced; in 
1988 production fell to 6,179 tons from a larger 
acreage of 48,950 ha, giving an average yield of 125-
130 kg per ha, compared with the pre-invasion yield 
of 500 kg. The main causes are the neglect of many 
plots due to al)andonment, and the age of the coffee 
bushes. Many plots were abandoned when the popu-
lation fled from their villages during the massive 
Demonstrators in 
action at the end 
of the Pope John 
Paul's Mass in 
Taci Tolu, East 
Timar, 12 October 
1989. 
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Indonesian invasion from 1975 to 1979. Gradually some 
returned to tend their plots but years of neglect 
have taken their toll. 
The Indonesian administration has tried to boost 
production through rejuvenation and rehabilitation, 
promoting modern agricultural methods, the use of 
pesticides, insecticides and chemical fertilisers, but 
local growers are not interested. One grower said: 
'Too much fertiliser will ruin the aroma of the coffee'. 
The project has apparently failed because of lack of 
planning and the failure to convince the Timorese who 
regard all Indonesian schemes with suspicion. 
The coffee trade is even worse. Governor Carras-
calao has issued 3 decrees in six months. As part of 
the Carrascalao family, owner of the biggest coffee 
plantations, he is keen to improve the coffee trade. 
While coffee growers in Indonesia are more or less 
assured a stable price, Timorese growers are at the 
mercy of the buyers, often plainclothes military or 
from PT Denok, the military-owned monopoly trading 
company. Although ten companies are registered as 
coffee buyers, only PT Denok actually functions. While 
the coffee price in Indonesia rose to Rp 4,000, the 
price in East Timor was held down to Rp 1,000. Kom-
pas compares the situation with the monopoly position 
of the Portuguese in pre-1975 days. 
Carrascalao has struggled hard to rid East Timor of 
its special status which meant that East Timar was 
run by the army. He tried to break the Denok mono-
poly by boosting (government-led) village cooperative 
units (KUD) which were given powers to buy coffee 
from the peasants at fixed prices, bypassing the 
roving 'traders'. But the KUDs gave their licences to 
the traders who continue to buy direct from the 
growers. In June 1989, the set KUD prices were Rp 
2,300 a kilo for A quality and Rp 1,900 for B quality. 
The traders blame lo.w quality and low world market 
prices. Instead of helping the peasants, the KUDs 
charge them a Rp 50 tax for every kilo of coffee sold 
to the traders. Kompas said that up to September, 
KUDs have raked in Rp 750 million in tax but no one 
knows where the money has gone. 
Carrascalao's second decree in August 1988 es-
tablished a team to fix the price of coffee but the 
prices were ignored by Denok traders. In October, 
Carrascala.o withdrew both decrees and opened the 
trade to market forces, hoping to break the Denok 
monopoly by inviting anybody wanting to buy coffee 
to come to Eaet Timor. Whether it will work is doubt-
ful but the Carrascalao family interests have been 
jeopardised for too long. 
Land conversion 
Another problem is land ownership. Unless this is 
solved, new investors will not be interested. The In-
donesian Constitution says that all natural resources 
'belong to the people'. This is often (mis)used to 
confiscate or expropriate land for the state. The 
government wants to apply Indonesian laws (including 
the Basic Agrarian Law) in East Timor. As a former 
Portuguese colony, the 1961 Portuguese Agrarian Law 
is still regarded by East Timorese as valid. Jakarta 
decided not to add to international opprobrium by 
confiscating all the land and decided to move step by 
step. Since 1982, land ownership has been registered 
under Portuguese Law no 2001/1944. About 800 cer-
tificates have been issued as slvara (permanent), 
alvara de concessao provisoria (provisional) or alvara 
indigena (traditional} land rights. 
Another complication is the uprooting of virtually 
the entire population, leaving huge tracts of land 
empty and untended. The chief of the National Land . 
Board (BPN) for East Timor argues that ~and is the 
only possession the East Timorese have got left since 
their livestock and houses were destroyed. To obtain 
EASTT!MOR 
Military resort command 164, the territorial command 
in East Timar. 
capital in order to trade, Timorese need proof of their 
land rights. The BPN is a new body, directly respon-
sible to President Suharto, with the daunting task of 
handling explosive land issues all over the archipel-
ago. On several occasions, East Timorese have deman-
ded clarity about their land rights. Some East Timor-
ese have openly asked for the Portuguese law to 
remain in force but officials from Jakarta insist that 
sooner or later, Indonesian laws must be enforced, 
According to the 1960 Agrarian Law, the right of 
conversion into different categories of land or land 
usage is regulated by Dutch law, further complicating 
procedures of converting land entitlement. 
The land issue in East Timor is complex. Kompas 
gives the example of Aileu sub-district. Since 1976, 
the population has fallen by half, from 40,000 to 
20,000. Thousands of hectares of agricultural land 
have been abandoned due to the war. Many East 
Timorese refugees abroad own land and have trans-
ferred it to relatives in Timor. According to a Laksus-
da regulation (Laksusda was the territorial command 
for the security body, Kopkamtib, dissolved in 1988), 
it is not possible to transfer land rights without 
Laksusda approval. Land previously owned by the 
Portuguese administration has become property of the 
local government and land owned by the Portuguese 
army has gone to the armed forces. It is not clear 
whether the dissolution of Kopkamtib (replaced by 
Bakorstanasda) means that this regulation is now 
invalid. But the BPN has yet to begin the work of 
defining the status of the different land certificates, 
in particular .. indigenous land rights which are mostly 
unsupported by documents. Since 1981 the adminis-
tration has issued many certificates to people for land 
ownership or use, based on Portuguese documents, or 
to people without documents, land titles and redistri-
bution documents. When Portuguese laws are even-
tually replaced by Indonesian laws, it is doubtful 
whether these certificates will still be valid, so the 
uncertainty will drag on. 
According to Loekman Soetrisno, the process of land 
alienation is already under way. "Traders from out-
side," he said, "have already been able to buy up 
people's land, leading to the fear that sooner or later 
all land in East Timor will be in the hands of non~ 
Timorese Indonesians." 
Indonesianiaation ~ 
Indonesianisation is very evident in Dili. From a"' 
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sleepy provincial town of 30,000, Dili has grown to 
100,000 inhabitants and is often compared with Yogya-
karta, the bustling centre ot Javanese culture. Many 
civil servants originate from Yogya, many senior civil 
servants are Gadjah Mada graduates, the university 
ot Yogya and the newly-established Universitas 
Timtim is virtually a branch of Gadjah Mada Univer-
sity. Even the pace in Dili has become Yogyanese, 
with a long siesta in the afternoon, though the 'fimor-
ese, including Governor Carrascalao, prefer to skip 
the afternoon nap. The 'advancements' of Indonesian 
rule have brought little benefit for the Timorese. The 
shops, the supermarkets and high positions in local 
government a.re all in the hands of Indonesians. The 
supermarkets are mostly filled with Indonesian cus-
tomers, civilians and military, as the average Timorese 
cannot afford to shop there. Kompas noted that only 
some street hawkers like cigarette sellers, shop 
employees and taxi drivers are indigenous Timorese. 
Governor Carrascalao is acutely aware of the domina-
tion of the Indonesians, in particular the Javanese, 
and is fighting like Don Quixote to introduce more 
East Timorese into the provincial administration. 
Integraal 
The Bishop's call for a referendum did not fall from 
the sky. Timorese resentment towards Indonesian 
colonialism persists; open protest against integration 
has spread. In the late 1970s, the Indonesian author-
ities, realising the difficulties they had with the older 
generation, decided to bet on the young. With In-
donesian education, it was argued, the younger 
generation would become true Indonesians. Ten years 
on, the younger generation who have grown up under 
Indonesian occupation are as defiant as ever. The 
voice of protest is growing and Governor Carras-
calao's option to operate within the Indonesian system 
while retaining the Timorese identity, culture and 
identity, is fast losing ground. In November, Carras-
calao travelled to villages in the south to convince 
people that the option of a referendum is closed. He 
called for unity among the Timorese and pleaded with 
those still fighting in the mountains to come down and 
unite with the rest of the people. 
The Indonesian-appointed governor is fast losing 
influence; since his efforts to fight the army's coffee 
monopoly, he has made new enemies in the army. The 
recently appointed vice-governor, Colonel Saridjo, 
wields a lot of influence among fellow Javanese civil 
servants. Although Carrascalao often protects East 
Timorese from persecution, he has disappointed his 
Bishop Belo 
countrymen by rejecting the bishop's call for a 
referendum. More than ever, the governor confronts 
the fact that pre .... 1975 Timorese political and social 
structures still predominate. The Timorese reject 
Indonesian values; everything from Indonesia is 
second rate, argues the average Timorese. Efforts to 
attract foreign and Indonesian private capital have 
so far been futile. Land conversion, which is essential 
to attract capital, is still far from realised. The 
governor complains: "It's all just a lot of talk. When-
ever I meet (potential investors), they say they are 
interested. But it's just lip service". .... 
Sources: 'Resisting the stifling cloak of Indonesian 
rule', by Louise Williams, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 
October 1989; 'The slow taming of Timor' by Roy 
Eccleston, The Australian, 21 October 1989; 
'Catatan dari Timtim' (Report from East Timor), six 
articles by St. Sularto and Damyan Godho in Kompas, 
29 November - 4 December 1989; 'Visiting a forgotten 
war' by Rod Nordland, Newsweek, 23 October 1989; 
'Investor, baru asal omGng' (Investors, just talk) by 
Ibrahim G. Zakir, Editor 9 December 1989; Suara Pem-
baruan, 9 and 23 November 1989. Jakarta Post, 6 
January 1990; Kompas, 5 January 1990. 
Clampdown follows the Pope's visit 
.Vew forms of struggle are emerging in Dili. Young people have come onto the streets to defend 
Bishop Belo, who has given sanctuary to people fearing arrest. Youngsters have defended 
themselves against troops with nothing more than stones. In Jakarta, people speak about 
'Timor's intifa~a ', not just because of the forms of struggle but also because,. like the Israeli 
army, Indonesian troops use extreme violence against unarmed resistance in the cities. 
Many arrests occurred in the wake of Pope John 
Paul's visit to East Timor on I2 October last year. 
Army intelligence alleges that the demonstration 
during the Pope's mass was organised by Catholic 
priests and the demonstrators were all from Catholic 
schools, in particular, Sao Jose in Dili and Fatumaca 
in Baucau. Several Indonesian publications have 
accused Father Locatelli, an Italian priest at Fatuma-
c~, of being the prime mover. Hence, the schools have 
been under severe pressure, while Bishop Bela's home 
has now. become a sanctu':1r.y for many fearing arrest. 
Im~ed1~tely after the v1s1t,. abou~ forty people were~ 
d
0
etamed, others fled to the Bishop s residence. At one 
time there were 28 people taking sanctuary. 
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Anti-Belo demonstration 
On 4 November, an anti-Belo demonstration organised 
by the pro-Indonesian Apodeti with the support of 
senior army officers, took place outside the Bishop's 
home. They demanded that Be!o and four other priests 
leave the country, and demanded the surrender of 
people taking refuge in his house. Another crowd 
gathered, taking the Bishop's side. When troops 
intervened, the latter crowd started throwing stones 
at the soldiers' vehicles. According to one report, 
some students inside the Bishop's house were taken 
away by troops during the turmoil. When the crowds 
dispersed, troops chased the pro-Belo demonstrators. 
The next day, several students who had allegedly 
taken part in the demonstration at the Pope's mass 
were arrested and taken to Wisma Senopati II. !fwo of 
the detainees are known to be students at Sao Jose 
school in Dili. Both were tortured with electric-shock 
treatment and beaten. Meanwhile, two teachers and 
two students from the school had gone into hiding, 
w.hile another four Sao Jose students were being held 
at another detention centre. 
Catholic school attacked 
Shortly after this incident, all the 28 people in sanc-
tuary with the Bishop had left his house though 
whether by force or voluntarily is not clear. Accord-
ing to a message from Bishop Belo in December, at 
least eight of them were immediately arrested. 
Frustrated by their failure to find the four people 
in hiding, the army launched an attack on Sao Jose 
school on 15 November. The school was surrounded by 
troops from Kodim, the district military command, 
reinforced by a military police platoon and four 
platoons from Battalion 744, composed of Timorese 
troops. A clash ensued, with students hurling stones 
at the soldiers who advanced on the building with 
their bayonets at the ready. Some students fled as 
troops started firing M16s. On hearing of this attack, 
Bishop Belo rushed to the scene and was able to 
rescue one student who had been taken into custody 
by the soldiers and took him to his residence. 
The troops forced their way into the school and 
searched the building. A student found hiding in the 
toilets was beaten and fainted from the blows. 
Following this armed attack, more people fled to the 
Bishop's house. The number of people seeking refuge 
this time reached thirty. In an interview with the 
Portuguese weekly, Expresso L6 January l990J, Bishop 
Belo said that they had all left his home. 
Many names of detainees have now become available. 
According to one reliable source, twenty people were 
in detention in mid-December. Another source reports 
that eight detainees are due to be tried in January. 
However, outside observers are unlikely to know the 
exact number in custody as they are not being held 
in the two Dili prisons where convicted prisoners are 
held, but in several buildings and private houses. 
These include the headquarters of Kopassus, the 
para-commandos, and of the district military command, 
Kodim, the premises of a business with close military 
connections and the homes of several Apodeti mem-
bers. 
EAST Tl MOR 
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One of the many security check points that still exist 
along the roads in East Timor. [Photo: Jan-Erik 
Forsberg] 
Timor•a intifada 
The day after Sao Jose school was attacked, a group 
of Timorese students managed to halt an army vehicle 
on the road between the Santa Cruz cemetery and 
Balide school in Dili. The vehicle was damaged and 
the officers were wounded. In retaliation, a company 
of troops pursued the students, killing one and 
seriously injuring another. Many others were ar-
rested and taken to military bases. 
There is also a report from Fretilin, Darwin that 
students raided an Indonesian party at Balai Prajurit 
(Soldier's Mess) on Christmas Eve, injuring several 
Indonesians and causing extensive damage to the 
building and to cars parked outside. In retaliation, 
Indonesian troops raided a Christmas party attended 
by hundreds of East Timorese students in Den Pasar, 
Bali; three students were seriously injured. During 
this raid, troops used their firearms and accidentally 
killed one of their own men. ~ 
The D-eri-v-e1ope, a. t:ra.p for comm-u.riist s-u.spects 
Job applicants in Indonesia may have their applica-
tions turned down because of information about 
themselves compiled in a secret 'D-envelope' indicat-
ing an 'unclean environment', meaning that they have 
politically undesirable family connections with alleged 
former communists. But because the contents of the 
D-envelope are strictly secret, the person in question 
is not likely to know what it is that stands in the way 
of a job. 
Data kept in the 'D-envelope' is stored in an in-
dividual's Folder A and consists of data gathered from 
Continued on back page. 
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cha.ri.ges iri. a.:rmy str'-.1.ct'-.l.re 
On 6 December 1989, the army command structure in 
East Timor was re-organised. The special operational 
command known as Koopskam Timtim (Komando Operasi 
Keamanan Timor Timur) was disbanded and the army 
command in the territory, known as Korem, was placed 
under the IXth divisional command based in Den 
Pasar, Dili. The changeover has been promised for 
many months. The existence of Koopskam, set up in 
1983 under the direct command of army headquarters 
in Jakarta, meant that there was a special line of 
command to cope with the security situation and the 
continuing level of military operations. Emphasising 
the importance the army attaches to stamping out 
armed resistance in East Timor, the leadership of 
Koopskam was for years held by the commander of the 
1st infantry battalion of Kostrad, the army's strategic 
command. Koopskam commander, Brigadier-General 
Mulyadi, has moved out and Colonel Bimo, the widely-
feared head of intelligence, has been replaced. 
It appears however that the army has retained a 
special structure in East Timor, replacing Koopskam. 
Governor Carrascalao was quoted as saying, at a 
Christmas gA.thering in Dili attended by armed forces 
EEC Go-ve:rr:l.mer:l.ts -voice cor:l.cet:rr:l. 
Some western embassies are known to be monitoring 
the human rights situation in East Timor. In a state-
ment on behalf of the 12 members of the European 
Community, at the UN General Assembly Third Commit-
tee on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs on 20 
November, the French delegate said: 
The Twelve remain pre-occupied by information 
about human rights violations in East Timor. They 
have taken note that the territory has been opened 
up to a degree to the outside world since January 
1989, in line with the concerns they expressed in face 
of the absence of significant progress in the ter-
ritory. They hope that the opening up also means that 
non-governmental organisations, including human 
rights organisations, may soon be permitted to visit 
the territory. They again repeat the hope that there 
will be an end to the reported abuses. 
It is clear that the East Timorese are now undertak-
ing high-risk actions on the streets of Dili, forcing 
the western powers to take seriously the repression 
to which the people have been subjected ever since 
East Timor was occupied by Indonesian troops. '} 
Army Helicopter shot d.o~r.i. 
Fretilin in Lisbon has claimed that the guerrilla 
resistance shot down an army helicopter near Venila-
le, south of Baucau, the chief military base, on 4 
January. The Fretilin statement said there had been 
fighting in the regions of Bercoli and Baucau on 3 
January the day before the helicopter was hit. They 
claimed that nine Indonesian soldiers had been killed. 
Quite independently, news was received from a 
protected source in Jakarta that a helicopter had 
crashed on 10 January in the region of Baucau killing 
twelve officers, four lieutenant-colonels and eight 
command-in-chief General Try Soetrisno, that on 6 
December, General Soetrisno transferred the powers 
held by the commander of Koopskam to the commander 
of a new body called Kolakskop Timtim. LMerdeka, 28 
December 1989 J We have not yet been able to decipher 
this new acronym, nor have we spotted any reference 
to the officer holding this new post. Carrascalao also 
said that whereas until now ABRI's duties in East 
Timor had been focused on 'security operations', its 
approach would switch to 'territorial guidance'. 
LSuara Merdeka, 28 December 1989J 
After more than a year of hard-hitting military 
operations and growing criticism, especially from 
foreign journalists who have been struck by the huge 
military presence in East Timor, some officials now 
believe that a 'hearts and minds' policy is called for. 
One source has claimed that Carrascalao recently 
threatened to resign if Colonel Prabowo whose 328 
battalion is blamed for many of the worst atrocities 
since the end of 1988, is not withdrawn from East 
Timor. But events in Dili during January belie such 
pretensions. ~ 
majors, and suggesting that the aircraft may have 
been shot down by guerrillas. Allowing for the fact 
that news leaked from the army in Jakarta may have 
passed through many hands, it is difficult not to 
conclude that these two reports are about one and 
the same incident. The loss of so many officers caused 
panic in army circles at a time when attempts were 
being made to improve the army's image. 
This source also put the death-toll during the 17 
January incident at three, with twenty people in-
jured. -{'. 
EAST 'l'IMOR 
mwmMENT 
TOTllEUN 
llE!:<ll.ONIS/\'l'ION CUMMl'l"l'lm 
f'IJ.:\V YOllU , AUl!l l!''r. llJR9 
occasional reports no.11 
Price £0. 50 a. copy 
ir.i.ch..id.ir.i.g posta.ge 
Occasional Reports no. 11 contains Tapol's submission 
to the 1989 meeting of the UN Decolonisation Committee 
and focusses on the militarised structure of the 
Indonesian administration in East Timor and the truth 
about the 'opening up' of East Timor 
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The 14 December 1988 proclamation 
The proclamation on 14 December 1988 of a West Melanesian state by Thomas Wainggai at the 
Mandala Stadium in Jayapura has won support throughout West Papua. This is evident from 
demonstrations held in West Papua to mark the first anniversary of the proclamation. 
Documents from Dr Wainggai's trial in Jayapura make it possible to report in greater detail 
the intentions and beliefs of Dr Wainggai and his colleagues. 
Although the documents refer on several occasions to 
the activities of the OPM or Free Papua Movement, Dr 
Wainggai's proclamation represents a departure from 
the programme and traditions of the OPM. The use of 
the name, West Melanesia is one indication; another is 
that the flag raised by the demonstrators on 14 
December 1988 was not the Morning Star which has 
been used by the OPM and by numerous flag-raisers 
in West Papua since the 1970s. It was a revised 
version of the Stars and Stripes designed in 1961 for 
the independent West Papuan state being promoted 
when the country was still under Dutch control. Dr 
Wainggai's flag consists of three stripes and a cross. 
The addition of the cross emphasises the strong 
religious overtones of Wainggai's movement. All his 
documents quote extensively from the Bible and he 
argues that, by annexing his country, the Indonesians 
violated the Ten Commandments, in particular, the 
eighth and tenth commandments. In one document, ·he 
lists 370 people, including several dozen Christian 
ministers, who prayed and fasted to ask God's bless-
ing for the proclamation. The list is headed by 
several US churchmen and their wives, including Rev. 
Oral Roberts, a leading television evangelist and his 
wife. Wainggai claims that many received visions con-
firming God's support. 
Appeal to the UN Secretar7 General 
On 14 November 1988, a month before the proclama-
tion, Wainggai wrote to the UN Secretary-General 
notifying him that the proclamation would take place. 
He asked the secretary-general, 
1. to send a UN security-keeping force to West 
Melanesia prior to the proclamation, 
2. to ask the Indonesian Government to withdraw all 
its military forces before that date, and 
3. to ask the Indonesian Government to repatriate all 
Indonesians residing or working in West Melanesia 
prior to that date. 
He said that the country has enough educated and 
skilled personnel to run a government efficiently and 
effectively; any shortages could be filled by recruit-
ing people from overseas. Economically, the country 
is rich in natural resources. A state constitution has 
been drafted, a national anthem composed, a state 
emblem and a national flag designed, and a state 
motto, "The Lord is Our Shepherd", adopted. A com-
prehensive development plan has been drafted for 
each province and village. All these products are the 
work of Dr Wainggai himself, he told the UN secretary 
general. 
Copies of the letter to the UN were sent to 15 
governments, including the governments of five West 
European countries, all the Scandinavian countries, 
the US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Israel. 
An Indonesian policeaan at a Papuan aarket-place in 
Yiwika in the Baliem Valley. [Photo: Anders Uhlin] 
Historical Juatiticatlona 
In a statement to the court on 29 May 1989, Dr Waing-
gai likened his people's right to independence to that 
of the Indonesian people who won their independence 
from the Dutch. He condemned the 1969 'act of free 
choice' as a violation of international law and pointed 
out that the 1962 New York agreement between Holland 
and Indonesia stipulated that all adults should vote in 
the plebiscite. 
Up to this point, his analysis is based on historical 
fact, but he also refers to events about which he has 
clearly been mis-informed. He speaks of an (unheard-
of) agreement between Indonesia and Holland in Rome 
in 1962 for the transfer of West Melanesia from 
Indonesia to the people of West Melanesia after 25 
years of Indonesian rule (1963-1988). Hence, his Ill 
proclamation was, he claims, in accord with what ., 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 97, February 1990 9 
WEST PAPUA 
Indonesia has already consented to. He claims that the 
UN General Assembly tldopted a resolution at its 1988 
session supporting independence for West Melanesia 
by 116 votes to 36, with 18 abstentions. He even 
claims that President Suharto told Barnabas Suebu, 
governor of Irian Jaya, some time in May or June 1988 
that 'from October 1988, lrilln Jaya will sail the 7 
seas• which he interpreted llS meaning that Indonesia 
'approves of independence for West Melanesia'. He also 
refers to a message from Holland on 25 May 1989 to 
the effect that a ship will arrive from there bringing 
home West Melanesian political refugees. 
Dr Wainggai seems to have been the victim of mis-
information on a colossal scale and seriously believes 
t hat salvation for the people of West Papull will come 
from outside, primarily from the UN whose record on 
West Papua is one of gross betrayal; he himself 
recognises this as he condemns the uN•s decisions in 
1962 and 1969 which violated the UN Charter and the 
1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
There . is no suggestion in any of Dr Wainggai's 
statements that he sees his action as part of the OPM 
struggle; his intention is, rather, to arouse support 
throughout West Papua for his own proclamation and 
to mobilise popular protest in the cities and towns. 
However shaky the historical justifications for his 
proclamation, his move has created a new confidence 
among West Papuans and more open opposition to 
Indonesian rule. ir' 
Hundreds arrested in Jayapura 
Hundreds of people were arrested in Jayapura, the 
capital of West Papua (known in Indonesia as Irian 
Jaya), on 14 December 1989, following a demonstration, 
attended by many hundreds, to celebrate the first 
anniversary of Dr Thomas Wainggai's proclamation of 
a West Melanesian state on 14 December 1988. Most 
reports agree that the number of arrests in Jayapura 
was 400. 
There are also reports of demonstrations in other 
towns of West Papua but no details have been re-
ceived from these_ isolated places. 
Several international news agencies reported the 
demonstrations; the Far Eastern Economic Review [28 
December] said that "the demonstrators marched 
peacefully and there was no violence. The military 
later countered with a parade through the streets of 
Jayapura, waving Indonesian flags". 
The authorities apparently knew that something 
would happen as they were refusing to issue permits 
to anyone to visit West Papua for several weeks 
before 14 December. Two months before the event, a 
Swedish tourist visiting Jayapura heard of the 
preparations being made, involving "about a thousand 
peop1e". The information was passed on to TAPOL 
early in November. This suggests that the Wainggai 
network is widely supported and can organise events 
of this magnitude, virtually under the noses of army 
intelligence. 
The Indonesian press has reported nothing about 
the demonstration or the arrests, except for a denial 
from armed forces spokesperson, Brigadier-General 
Nurhadi Purwosaputro that anyone had been detained. 
[ Ja.Jca.rta Post, 22 December) 
Papuana Melt aa7luaa at PNG Conaulat.e 
Following the demonstration, a number of West Pap-
uans, fearing arrest, sought asylum at the Consulate 
of Papua New Guinea in Jayapura. This consulate was 
opened only a few months ago. 
Reports about the number of asylum-seekers vary. 
According to the FEER Lll January 1990), twenty 
persons initially sought refuge, including a Cendra-
wasih University political science lecturer and a local 
government official; no names were given. TAPOL was 
later able to confirm, just before the New Year, that 
four West Papuans were still taking refuge at the 
consulate and was told subsequently that all four had 
left the building. 
Our sources indicated that two of the four, Manbra-
ku and Jacob Baransano had left the consulate and 
returned to the university. Later we heard that 
another two, Ismael (Melki) Rumbiak and Martin 
Kambu, apparently the last two to leave, were later 
escorted across the border to Vanimo. We are still 
checking these reports. 
There were also reports that the PNG government, 
at the request of the Indonesian authorities, had 
suspended all traditional border-crossings, in an 
attempt to prevent people from seeking asylum in 
Papua New Guinea. Traditional border-crossinj{s take 
place to allow tribal peoples whose homelands straddle 
the border to visit kinsfolk on the other side. ~ 
West Papua: The 
ObHteration of a 
People 
The first two editions of this book 
appeared in 1983 and 1984. This 
third edition, publ ished in response 
to continuing demand, has been 
St!bstantially revised and updated, 
with new data on military operations, 
an appendix on the murder of the 
we.II-known West Papuan anthropol-
~91st, Arnold Ap, and recent informa-
tion about the exploitation of West 
Papua's natural resources. 
Published by Tapol, the 
Indonesia' Human Rights 
Campaign. 160pp. 
Price: £3.50 
plus postage 
Tapol, 111 Northwood Road, 
Thornton Heath, Surrey CR4 
BHW, UK 
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Impressions of West Papua 
and East Timor 
A Swedish tourist, Anders Uhlin, has written the 
following account of a visit to West Papua and East 
Timar from May to November last year: 
Last year, I spent six months in Indonesia and its 
colonies, West Papua and East Timor. After a course in 
Bahasa Indonesia in Malang and a month in Java, Bali 
and Lombok, I went to West Papua in October as a 
tourist. After a lot of bureaucratic hassles, I obtained 
a permit at police headquarters in Jakarta. (After-
wards I learnt that it would have been easier to get 
the permit in Jayapura.) 
Although I knew about the situation in the country 
and have been active in FF:P, (Swedish Free Papua 
Movement), I had no intention of seeking contact with 
the resistance, so I was very surprised when several 
young people from the resistance, independently of 
each other, made contact with me. 
To be honest, I had expected to find West Papua a 
more or less integrated. part of Indonesia where most 
people accept Indonesian rule though they don't like 
it. But my fears were wrong. I met several people who 
were actively working in the resistance, spoke to 
dozens of OPM sympathisers and was told by almost 
every Papuan I met: "We are not Indonesians. We are 
Melanesians. Indonesia is occupying our country." 
Aversion 
The aversion to the Indonesians, or more precisely, 
to the Javanese, is easy to understand. It must be 
obvious to all visitors to the country that West Papua 
is a colony. The authorities and the administration are 
totally dominated by the Javanese. All shop-keepers 
are Chinese or Indonesian. I didn't even see a single 
Papuan minibus-driver. The military is always pre-
sent. Travelling on a bus from Sentani to Genyem, 
west of Jayapura, I witnessed how all the passengers 
had to show their identity cards at a military post. 
One member of the resistance whom I met was Alex 
(not his real name). We met at my hotel, in restaur-
ants or in the street. We had to be careful because 
the Indonesians have spies everywhere. I also visited 
his home in Hamadi. He told me about the demonstra-
tion on 14 December 1988, and the trials of Dr Thomas 
Wainggai and his friends. He could now visit a rela-
tive of his (one of those arrested l,lfter 14 December 
1988) in prison once a week. They were afraid Thomas 
Wainggai would be moved to Java or be killed. Alex 
told me they were planning another demonstration on 
14 December 1989. The West Melanesian flag would be 
raised and an independent West Melanesia proclaimed. 
(They prefer to speak about West Melanesia rather 
than West Papua.) About a thousand people, mostly 
youths, .were involved. They had already prepared 
banners and held money in a secret bank account. 
According to Alex, there would be demonstrations not 
only in Jayapura but all over West Papua and in PNG 
as well. A few people from the Swiss and German red 
cross would be in Jayapura at the time to ensure that 
they got international attention. They were also 
telling tourists about their plans in the hope of 
getting journalists to West Papua. 
I have heard nothing about what really happened on 
14 December. I've had no news from my friends who 
Neighbourhood security set up in a traditional Papuan 
setting. 
[Photo: Anders Uhlin.] 
tell me it isn't safe to send letters as the Indonesians 
will open them. 
I also went to the Baliem Valley where I witnessed 
the cultural oppression and racial discrimination in 
and around Wamena. I also had the opportunity to get 
to know some of the proud and friendly Dani people. 
East Timor 
I took an unusual route to East Timor. After making 
my way from West Papua through the Moluccas, I 
arrived in the small island of Kisar, north-east of 
Timar. You can see Timor from Kisar so I asked people 
if it was possible to go from Kisar to the eastern part 
of East Timor but was told that it was forbidden; the 
only way was to go to Dili, some 20 hours by boat. 
I got a permit from the local authorities, the police 
and the military to travel and went there together 
with about 30 local people going to market in Dili to 
sell goats, pigs, hens, vegetables, etc. All the pas-
sengers had the same permits as me; the captain 
collected them all, together with their identity-cards. 
At the police office in, Dili, I asked for a permit to 
travel east to Baucau and Los Palos, but was told I 
couldn't go because of "lack of tourist facilities". 
I stayed with a clergyman avoiding the security 
agents at the hotels. I couldn't avoid being following 
by a man from 'public relations' [hubungan masyara-
kat) when I went to Ermera. Even when I was alone 
in Dili or on the day I went to Aileu, I felt that peopl; 
were afraid of speaking to me. ~ 
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H'--t.rna.n. Ri g hts Briefs 
LBR calls for abolition of capital pu~nt . 
The Indonesian Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes 
(YLBHI) has made a renewed ca~l for the abolition of 
capital punishment in Indonesia. In a press con-
ference on Human Rights Day, 10 December 1989, the 
director, Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara said the Founda-
tion had first raised this demand ten years ago but 
the government had still not reacted. 
He said that 15 people were under sentence of 
death awaiting execution in Indonesia; most had been 
t II h • f in prison since the late 1960s. T eir ages range rom 
59 to 74. One is a former member of parliament, 
another a former member of the Supreme Advisory 
Council. Others are either former members of the elite 
presidential guard, Cakrabirawa, or former functiona-
ries of the now-banned Indonesian communist party 
or labour unions." Hakim also said that two of the 
fifteen may already have been executed. "We are 
awaiting confirmation from the authorities." 
Hakim announced that the Foundation will hold a 
public discussion on the death penalty. [Indonesian 
Observer, 11 December 1989J 
The Foundation also called on the Indonesian 
Government to ratify the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, adopted by the UN in 1948. ~ 
Head teacher removed for writing t.o the press 
A head teacher has been told to resign because he 
wrote to the press urging that twelve teachers at his 
school be upgraded. M.S. Klaas, head teacher of a 
primary school in Kupang, said in Jakarta that he had 
received an instruction from the chief of the district 
education office to resign as head teacher for doing 
something 'unworthy'. The instruction said that the 
governor of Nusa Tenggara Timar was 'furious' with 
Klaas for writing to the press. 
He was accused of breaching a 1980 government 
decision that civil servants must 'uphold the good 
name of the state and government'. Two earlier letters 
to the press were passed on to the Administration 
Agency for Civil Servants, he said, adding that if it 
was true he had breached the 1980 decision, he would 
not only resign his headship but would also resign 
from the civil service. L Suara Karya, 15 December 
19891 ~ 
Headscarf wearing is political? 
A 1982 directive from the Department of Education 
calls attempts by Muslim women to wear headscarves 
(jilbab) a political, not a religious act which therefore 
called for 'special vigilance'. This came to light in a 
report about young schoolgirls in different parts of 
the country who have been sent home froin school for 
refusing to take off their headscarves because they 
are considered inappropriate for girls wearing school 
uniform. 
Almost every year, the 'headscarves issue' at school 
re-emerges. This year there is a.n added problem in 
East Java where Muslim women have refused to comply 
with a request that they remove their headscarves 
when being photographed for identity cards. In one 
sub-district, the women were summoned by the sub-
district military command and questioned over the 
affair. The local official threatened not to issue 
identity cards if they failed to comply with instruc-
tions. Many women from two villages have asked the 
Surabaya-based Legal Aid Institute to handle the case 
women in headscarves. A dangerous political movement? 
for them. 1 Tempo, 9 December 19891 
Schoolgirls who refuse to take off their headscarves 
at school in Cirebon, West Java, have been threatened 
with expulsion. One head teacher, elaborating on the 
, l't' l' accusation that the headscarf movement was po l ica ; 
said: "They make themselves exclusive. They refuse to 
answer questions, just like ex-members of the PKI. 
When I ask them who their teacher is and whether 
their religious teachers gave them money, they 
refused to reply." l Tempo, 13 January 19901 {'. 
Another book banned 
A book entitled Peristiwa Lampung dan Gerakan 
Sempalan Islam L The Lampung Incident and Islamic 
Splinter Movements] has been banned by the Attor-
ney-General. The book is a compilation of press 
reports by writer and compiler, P. Bambang Siswoyo. 
This is not the first time Siswoyo's compilations have 
been banned. At least five other books of his have 
been outlawed. This latest compilation came out in 
April last year and was circulating in bookshops for 
six months before the Attorney-General took action. 
Siswoyo said he had 'zero' interest in politics but 
had simply been trying to fill a niche in the market. 
He told Jawa Pos that this latest ban would not 
diminish his spirit for compiling books. 
Indonesia News Service comments that the ban may 
stem from the book's extensive discussion of land 
issues in Lampung as the background to the incident. 
LINS, No 227, December 13 1989J All government-
inspired reportage about the incident and the Lam-
pung trials now in progress make no mention of these 
crucially-important land issues. -,,.. 
Newspaper banned from reporting justice affairs . 
Since October 1989, the Jakarta daily Harian Terb1t 
has been banned from reporting anything connected 
with the Department of Justice because of a series of 
articles criticising the chairman of the Subang 
district court early in the year. The articles men-
tioned the chairman, M Djazuli, in connection with a 
bribe paid during a case under consideration by the 
court. The ban issued by the Minister of Justice, 
Ismael Saleh, specifies that no departmental officials 
at the centre or in the regions are authorised to give 
statements or information to the newspaper. This 
means that Harian Terbit is denied access to lawcourts 
as well. 
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Djazuli is in the process of suing the newspaper 
for Rp 750 million; his own court is hearing the case 
before a panel of judges all of whom are his 
subordinates. 
Earlier in the year, a similar ban was imposed on 
the same newspaper for publishing a cartoon depict-
ing the sorry plight of prisoners. L Tempo, 6 January 
1990J ~ 
Journalist on trial 
A journalist, Wahid, from the Jakarta daily, Berita 
Buana, is on trial for allegedly publishing incorrect 
information about pig-fat in October 1988. The report 
headed 'Many manufactured foodstuffs contain pig 
fat', listed 63 products said to be made with pig fat. 
The reports, which appeared in a number of news-
papers, caused a nationwide panic against buying 
many products. It took weeks before the authorities 
could convince the public that the reports were 
exaggerated, revealing how little faith people have in 
what officials say. Although press reports were based 
on a study by a scientist, Dr Tri Susanto, the gov-
ernment turned on the press, blaming it for causing 
public unrest. President Suharto ordered the Attor-
ney-General to get to the bottom of the affair while 
Admiral Sudomo, Minister-Coordinator for Political and 
Security Affairs, blamed three newspapers for being 
the first to publish the results of the survey. 
Now, one journalist has been singled out and is on 
trial. The indictment states that although Dr Tri had 
listed only 34 products, the Berita Buana list included 
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63 products. Wahid is accused of adding 29 products 
although he insists that he received the list he 
published from an official of the Department for 
Religious Affairs. Wahid is also accused of failing to 
check the report, of 'deliberately' giving the item to 
a compositor for publication, and of failing to consult 
the chief editor and managing-director of his paper. 
His lawyer argued that, at most, Wahid was an acces-
sory; the person responsible was Dr Tri. Moreover, 
when the report appeared, no-one wrote in to correct 
it, nor did anyone complain to the journalists' as-
sociation, the PWI. [Editor, 25 November 1989J -':/--
General Edi's new approach 
Dramatic changes in many parts of the world have not 
pass unnoticed among the military in Jakarta. In 
particular the fall of Nicolai Ceausescu, the absolute 
ruler of Romania, was a heated topic of discussion. 
Comparisons between the two dictators, Ceausescu and 
Suharto - who both came to power in 1965 - were 
drawn, privately of course. As was to be expected, 
the army leadership has made some shifts in policy, 
reflected in some rather striking statements by army 
chief-of-staff, General Edi Sudradjat. 
Territ.orial guidance 
Last December, an important gathering was held in 
Magelang, seat of the Military Academy (AMNJ. All 
territorial middle- and high-ranking officers gathered 
to discuss plans, attitudes and strategies. Six days 
were spent discussing the territorial work and 
guidance of the army. The Indonesian army structure 
mirrors the civil administration, with parallel com-
mands from top to bottom, down to the village level. 
The early army commanders, Nasution and Simatu-
pang, conscious of the fragile unity of the Indonesian 
nation, placed emphasis on the territorial structure. 
The focus on the territorial management of the 
country became so strong that in the fifties, the 
territorial commanders, among them Suharto, were ry campaigns, the West Irian campaign and the 
virtual warlords. The defeat of the PRRl/Permesta Malaysia confrontation, both led by General Suharto 
rebellion (led by territorial commanders like Lt.Colonel This was later reinforced by the East Timor invasio~ 
Ahmad Hussein and Lt.Colonel Ventje Sumual) by in 1975 and the continuing operations against the 
Jakarta-led troops created a new situation. From then liberation movement in West Papua. 
on, alongside the new, centralised power of President In 1983 when General Benny Murdani took over as 
Sukarno (under Guided Democracy), the army struc- commander-:in-chief of the armed forces (ABRI), the 
ture steadily became more centralised. During the ba~ance shifted toward.s the strike-force feature. 
sixties, there was a balance between the territorial Bemg a paracommando himself (without any territorial 
structure and the army as strike-force, the latter experience) Murdani was assigned to trim down th Ill 
becoming increasingly important with the two milita- armed forces, which in practice meant slimming dow~., 
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the territorial str ucture. Of the 16 military commands, 
10 now remain while the str ike force capacity was 
strongly boosted by the e stablishment of two rapid-
deployment divis ions r eady to s trike at anytime, 
anywhere in the republic. Mur dani's predecessor, 
General Mohammad Yusuf (commander -in-chief from 
1978-1983) was a t ypical territorial soldier and during 
his tenure, the Undang-Unda.ng Pertahana.n (Basic 
Defence Law ) was enacted. This reinforced the ter-
ritorial structure as the basis of the country's 
defence. But Murdani gave his policy a different 
thrust, strongly favouring the strike-force comman-
dos. 
Leadership style must change 
Now, the pendulum has swung back again; the 
present leadership emphasises the territorial struc-
ture. General Edi Sudradjat, the present army chief-
of-staff, has both paracommando and territorial 
experience and is t rying to restore the balance by 
reinforcing the territorial structure. At the end of the 
six-day seminar, the four-star general made some 
remarks that immediately caught the headlines. 
Sudradjat, the first AMN graduate to reach the 
position of chief-of-staff, declared: "An authoritarian 
leadership style can no longer work". He said that 
dramatic changes are taking place, not only in In-
donesia but globally. The trend towards globalisation 
has reached Indonesia and the impact of the informa-
tion era is being felt. He took the rapid changes in 
Eastern Europe as an example and said he had tested 
his territorial officers with questions about the Berlin 
Wall and the defection of Nadia Comaneci, the Roma-
nian gymnast. 
Generals Try Soetrisno (seated, left) and General Edi 
Sudradjat (right), with the general staff, 
A drastic change of leadership was needed, he 
argued, a leadership geared to dialogue, argumenta-
tion and analysis. The present leadership is only able 
to anticipate things and act like a fire-brigade. 
Territorial officers should improve their general 
knowledge and ability to cope with the quickening 
flow of information. Territorial soldiers should not be 
'passive-reactive'; they should be 'active-responsive', 
capable of anticipating events. 
Indonesia watchers have long waited for officers 
like Edi Sudradjat to make their views known. Until 
recently, only the "old guard" could be heard, taking 
their pro- or anti-Suharto positions. The 1945 genera-
tion of officers have all reached retirement and all 
the top army posts are now occupied by the younger 
generation. Edi Sudradjat, an 1960 AMN graduate, 
together with classmates like General Harsudiono 
Hartas, and 1961 graduates like General Sahala 
Rajagukguk and Suripto, are now running the army. 
Gradually too, exponents from the classes of '62 and 
'63 are coming to the top. 
By comparison with the Suharto generation, whose 
military training was poor, the present generation 
has been professionally trained with more professional 
attitudes. This has many implications. It can mean for 
example that a contemporary military academy gradu 
ate does not have the same political aspirations as 
their seniors. These aspirations, called Dwi-fungsi, 
are enshrined in the Constitution, and justify the 
continuing dominant role of the military in society. It 
seems that the present generation of officers would 
prefer to play a more restricted role in civilian 
affairs and stick to the more military tasks in society. 
Confining themselves to military affairs happens to 
run parallel with Suharto's gradual change in leader-
ship style. 
A profile of Edi Sudradjat 
Edi Sudradjat is a true representative of the new 
generation of officers and together with Harsudiono 
Hartas, has become the spokesperson for the present 
leadership. He has held a variety of posts. As an AMN 
graduate he joined the notorious RPKAD red-beret 
commandos (now called KOPASSUS), underwent intel-
ligence training and was later appointed to several 
KOSTRAD (strategic reserve corps) posts. In this 
capacity, he went on operations in East Timor. After 
a period as Kostrad commander, he later switched to 
territorial work, becoming territorial commander in 
North Sumatra, then in the prestigious West Java/Si-
liwangi division. He then returned to headquarters 
and since February 1988 has been army chief-of-staff, 
Formally, ABRI commander-in-chief General Try 
Sutrisno is Edi Sudradjat's superior but Edi's in-
fluence both at HQ and among the territorial officers 
far exceeds Sutrisno's. Firstly Try Sutrisno is from 
the engineer corps and is not an AMN graduate; his 
military career has been strongly promoted by Presi-
dent Suharto, whose personal aide he was for several 
years. Edi Sudradjat and the other top generals are 
close to General Benny Murdani, the still powerful 
minister of defence. Murdani still holds a pivotal posi-
tion in the Jakarta power game and although his 
relations with the president have deteriorated in the 
last two years, Murdani remains a staunch constitu-
tionalist and will bear his grudges and grievances 
towards Suharto as a martyr. 
The example of the recently deceased General Sarwo 
Edhie is a clue to the behaviour of the majority of 
the Indonesian soldiers. Although Sarwo Edhie was 
in deep conflict with Suharto, he kept his grievances 
to himself and as a soldier remained loyal, accepting 
all kinds of difficult assignments. As long as ABRI 
officers stick to this 'cadaver discipline', Suharto can 
sleep peacefully at night. 
Towards civilian rule? 
At the start of his Orde Baru regime, General Suhal'to, 
relied heavily on military strength, but over the 
years many of his military advisors and assistants 
have either died or become adversaries. There are 
very few real Suharto loyalists left among the 'old 
guard', although hardly any have gone into open 
confrontation with the President. Many of the Presi-
dent's new confidants are either young technocrats or 
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old-time business cronies like Liem Sioe Liong or Bob 
Hassan. 
For several years, Suharto has been trying to 
fortify his rule by limiting the role of the military. 
Since the early eighties Suharto has been striving to 
transform Indonesia into an corporatist state, unified 
around a single ideology, with one strong political 
party, one strong youth movement and so on, the true 
definition of a corporatist state. All kinds of safety 
valves have been created, with 'free' elections staged 
in such a way that Suharto has always emerged as 
the victor (Suharto could have taught Marcos or 
General Pinochet a thing or two), with no viable 
alternatives to a strong, Suharto government, helped 
along by Golkar. 
So far the transformation from military dictatorship 
to corporatist state has gone smoothly as it seems 
that the present army leadership has been satisfied 
with a less prominent position in society. Moreover 
Suharto is confident that the military will behave 
within the constitutional framework; nor are there 
signs that any generals are trying to create a 'Mani-
la-type' situation. Most of Suharto's adversaries who 
make their views public are retired army officers on 
the margins of mainstream politics. This group of 
people, hardly united in their opposition, have also 
lost their limited influence among the students and 
intellectuals. Suharto's position still looks solid, a 
situation that has for years been taken for granted. 
POLITICS 
Still as events elsewhere have shown, storm clouds 
could burst at any time, shattering this tranquillity. 
ABRI1 the king-maker . 
A Japanese newspaper, Nippon Keizai Shim bun filed 
a report early in January that Suharto has been 
advised by his confidants to step down in 1993. The 
report argues that if Suharto were to stand for the 
sixth term, a Ceausescu-type situation would emerge 
in Indonesia. Though reports like this should be read 
with some scepticism, it is true that it does not take 
much to de-stabilise the political situation in In-
donesia. In 1989 many minor issues flared up into 
nation-wide scandals. The alleged use of pork-fat in 
many household commodities and some months later 
the scare about poisoned biscuits almost led to natio-
nal hysteria. The land disputes reveal the govern-
ments inability to handle matters like this effectively. 
In some of these incidents, rifts between the gov-
ernment and army officers came into the open. The 
Kedung Ombo conflict created an almost open conflict 
between the government and some highly-placed 
officers. 
The rapidly-accumulating wealth of the Suharto 
family is causing anger and dissatisfaction in army 
ranks. History can repeat itself over and over again. 
As in the early fifties when the army grudgingly took 
a back seat for a brief period, it might happen again 
that Edi Sudradjat and his men will decide that they 
have lost too much influence. After all, the army is 
still the strongest political force in the country, not 
least because they carry the guns. When the time for 
succession arrives, whether it happens by constitu-
tional means or not, they will certainly not be satis-
fied with a back seat. ~ 
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Giving students a lesson 
Six expelled students of the Bandung Institute of Technology (!TB) are now on trial in Ban-
dung. Five others arrested with them have been released and are unlikely to be charged. All 
eleven students were summarily expelled by the rector following a demonstration on campus 
on 5 August 1989. The six men on trial have been on the offensive, stressing the political 
nature of their protest action and challenging procedural obstructions. 
Major-General Arie Sudewo, commander of the West 
Java Siliwangi Division, in his capacity as chair of 
Bakorstanasda, the regional organ to safeguard 
stability, told a press conference before the trials 
began that they were not political trials but were 
being held "to uphold the law". In an attempt to warn 
students against demonstrating outside the courts, 
he said people should not utilise the trials "for all 
manner of things" and warned the press "to report 
things properly" ( wajar), "not tendentiously". Yet 
Bakorstanasda and its central organ, Bakorstanas has 
been busy making sure that the students held resp-
onsible for the 5 August demonstration would be 
punished, giving the case a distinct politjcal flavour. 
The arrests were made - without warrants - and the 
students were interrogated and maltreated by Bakor-
stanasda officers. Throughout their detention, the 
students were in the hands of Bakorstanasda, in 
breach of the Criminal Procedures Code. lSee TAPOL 
Bulletin No 96, December 1989.J 
For his part, Sukarton Marmosudjono, the Attorney-
General said that the six were being tried "to give 
them a lesson" and to make sure that their actions 
would not spread. 
The trials arise out of a student protest against a 
visit to ITB campus by Interior Minister, (ret'd) 
General Rudini, on 5 August last year to open a 
course on Pancasila indoctrination for first-year 
students. Students protested against the visit, staged 
a walk-out, unfurled banners and burnt used tires as 
a mark of disapproval. 
The six on trial are: Arnold Purba, aged 24, a third-
year geo-physics students; Mohamad Djumhur Hidayat, 
21, a student ~t the physics and technology faculty; 
Bamba~g. Sug1y{1nto, 23, of the civil engineering 
faculty; Ammarsyah bin Syahbuddin, 24, of the 
electro.;..technic faculty; Fadjroel Rachman 25 of the 
h . f , t c em1stry acuity; and Suprianto. They are charged 
under three articles in the Criminal Code. Article 154 
makes it a crime . "deliberately to express in public 
hatred ~nd animosity ~wa~ds, or contempt for, the M. 
Indonesian government , with a maximum penalty of ,.. 
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seven years. Art icle 207 makes it a crime ~ ''.deliber-
ately express contempt p~1bliclr for ~n official or a.n 
official organ in In donesia , ';'hile Ar.ticle 208 1?~kes it 
· to "show or display rn pubhc any wr1tmg or 
a crime ff ' . l ff' 'al picture expressing contempt for an o ic1a or o l<~i 
g · I d nes1'a"· the maximum penalty for Article or an in n o • . . . 
207 is eighteen months and for Article it is 4 months. 
ITB students in action on 5 August 1989, with banners 
rejecting Rudini. [Tempo, 19. 8. 89] 
As one official from the West Java public prosecutor's 
office said: "If we can't get them on Article 154, we'll 
get them on one of the others". 
The trials are taking place simultaneously in six 
separate courtrooms of the Bandung district court. 
They have attracted widespread sympathy, with 
crowds of up to 3,000 students following the pro-
ceedings through loud-speakers outside the courts. 
Judges have frequently reprimanded those inside for 
shouting their approval of statements by the defen-
dants or their defence lawyers. 
"Halt the trials!" 
The defendants have been on the offensive since the 
start. Several gave opening statements ( eksepsi) 
strongly critical of political, economic and social 
conditions in Indonesia. 
Moh Djumhur Hidayat, who is charged with having 
been the 'field commander' of the protest, entitled his 
eksepsi 'Keep on fighting for democracy', 
There is widespread suspicion of the people in-
volved in this operatic performance. History shows 
that oppression gives rise to outbursts. Our action 
was the logical and rational consequence of previous 
developments. I sense in the prosecutor's indictment 
that he is not free to express his own thoughts. He is, 
after all, a member of KORPRI (the civil servants' 
association to which all government employees must 
belong). A gun is pointed at his back. This court is 
not trying us; it is trying the democratic aspirations 
of all students and all those who nurture the spirit of 
democracy in their hearts. LSuara Pembaruan, 6 
December 1989J 
Ammarsyah's eksepsi is entitled 'Brutality will not 
silence us; the iron fist is not the foundation for 
democracy', He made three demands - that the trials 
be halted, that the ITB rector be tried and that all 
the students who have been victimised by means of 
expulsion or suspensions be rehabilitated. 
Arnold Purba's eksepsi, 'I have heard the people's 
screams', pointed out that the students tried to raise 
a number of land issues in Cimacan, Badega and 
elsewhere, with government officials, parliament and 
local assemblies, but to no avail. General Rudini had 
also been approached but the promises he made were 
not kept. Arnold argued that the prosecutor's analy-
sis was superficial, and failed to recognise the 
political issues at the core of the students' action. 
Mohamad Fadjroel Rachman's eksepsi was called 'A 
Political Manifesto: the struggle for people's sover-
eignty'. He accused the prosecutor of failing to 
acknowledge that the students' action was aimed 
solely at opposing anti-democratic and authoritarian 
attitudes. Suprianto's eksepsi is entitled 'I shall hold 
high the banner of people's sovereignty'. 
Several defendants told the court of torture and 
mal-treatment; they were beaten, given electric 
shocks, only allowed to go to the toilet handcuffed 
and deprived of food. 
Invitation to Rudini, a provocation? 
It appears that a major element in the defence case 
will be that the ITB rector's decision to invite General 
Rudini to the campus was a deliberate move to pro-
voke protest from the students since he has t;>een on 
the receiving end of so many complaints during the 
past year. At the time of the incident, students said 
they saw his visit as a move to politicise the campus, 
although the students are prohibited from engaging 
in political activity. During cross-examination of the 
third deputy-rector of ITB who testified as a prose-
cution witness in several trials, a defence lawyer 
pressed the witness to explain why Rudini .had been 
invited to open the indoctrination course and not 
someone from BP7, the state indoctrination agency, 
"Was it not because of all these cases, Cimacan, 
Badega, Kedung Ombo and others, that Interior 
Minister Rudini was invited?" 
ITB rect.or refuses t.o testify 
The defence lawyers have repeatedly asked for 
Professor Wiratno Arismunandar, the ITB rector, to 
testify as a witness. Both the prosecution and the 
courts refused to call him and told the defence 
lawyers they could call him if they wished. Whether 
the defence could have done so is not clear, but they 
were pre-empted by a letter from the rector, refusing 
to testify. Calls for Interior Minister Rudini to testify 
have also been rejected by the courts. 
The defence also challeng·e the prosecution's descr-
iption of the meeting held at ITB on 4 August, when 
a decision was taken about the action. The meeting 
was not, as the prosecution asserts, a gathering of 
private individuals (making it sound like a conspir-
acy); it was a meeting of a legally-recognised on-
campus organisation, the Communications Forum of 
Faculty Organs (of which Djumhur Hidayat is general 
secretary) and took place with the knowledge of the 
university authorities, to discuss the 'drop-out' 
problem and the rector's invitation to Rudini. The ITB 
leadership cannot evade responsibility for what 
happened the next day, as they must have known that 
a decision was taken on 4 August to protest at the 
Rudini visit. 
Expulsions criticised 
The rector was also criticised by the defence for 
expelling the students before a court verdict had 
been passed, violating the principle of the presump-
tion of innocence. LBy contrast, Professor Koesnadi 
Hardjasoemantri, rector of Gadjah Mada University in 
Yogyakarta, did not expel Bambang Subono, a student 
at the university, or dismiss Bambang Is ti Nugroho 
who works at a university laboratory, when they were 
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arrested in 1988. Even after guilty verdicts, they 
were not expelled, as appeals were pending.) 
In Djumhur Hidayat's trial, a judge criticised the 
expulsions as 'hasty'. In fact, as the defence insists, 
the expulsions occurred without warning, nor were 
the students given the opportunity to defend them-
selves, violating the university's own regulations. The 
third deputy-rector of ITB acknowledged in court 
that students involved in the protest had been 
expelled by a "decision based on investigations by a 
special task-force set up for the purpose." After 
questioning this witness on the lnstitute's attitude 
towards students anxieties about social problems, the 
judge felt there was a lack of communication with the 
students. "If there had been proper communication 
between the two sides before Rudini's visit, perhaps 
the protests would not have occurred." 
Defendants refuse to testify 
It has become a tradition, in political cases, for courts 
in Indonesia to stage simultaneous trials of groups of 
defendants, calling on the defendants to testify 
against each other while their own trials are in 
progress. This time, however, all the defendants have 
refused to comply. 
Among the witnesses called by the prosecution are 
some of the five expelled students who were also 
arrested along with the six on trial but who were 
later released without charge. Defence lawyers 
questioned the logic of releasing these five even 
though they had been held on the same charges as 
their six colleagues. 
Several prosecution witnesses are members of the 
ITB's security corps (Satpam); another was a soldier 
who admitted that he mingled with the students, in 
civilian dress, to 'keep an eye on things'. Another 
described himself as having been at the campus on a 
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'secret assignment' to protect Rudini. 
Defendants walk out 
In January, the defendants walked out of several 
hearings, following an incident during Fadjroel 
Rachman's trial when a visitor was reprimanded for 
sitting with one foot up on his other knee. A securi-
ty officer then approached the visitor and kicked his 
foot down, prompting Fadjroel to protest. When the 
judge refused to reprimand the official, Fadjroel 
walked out, followed later by the other defendants. 
For several more sessions, the defendants' calls for 
action against the official were turned down, leading 
to more walkouts. 
Having reached deadlock over their complaint, the 
defendants drafted a joint statement protesting about 
this and other procedural difficulties they have faced 
in court. They were preventing from reading out the 
statement in court. It is addressed to the Indonesian 
Parliament, Amnesty International, the International 
Commission of Jurists, the ICJ's Centre for the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers and the press. 
Purba could get two ~ 
Summing up the case against Arnold Purba, the 
prosecution has called for a two-year sentence with 
deduction for time served. It had been proven, the 
prosecutor said, that the accused participated in the 
protest and attended the meeting which planned the 
protest. Among the aggravating circumstances was the 
fact that the accused has behaved 'impolitely' in court 
and has persisted in expressing his dislike for the 
government. ~ 
The Timor Gap treaty 
On 11 December 1989, in violation of international law, Australia signed a. treaty with Indonesia 
for the joint exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits in the stretch of sea between Australia 
and East Timor. Negotiations have been under way for ten years. The Australian petroleum 
industry ha.s long been eager to Jay hands on these deposits. 
The 'gap' denotes the stretch of sea between East 
Timar and Australia where no sea boundary has yet 
been drawn. In the early 1970s, negotiations between 
Portugal and Australia failed to reach agreement. 
Even now, after years of negotiation, there is no 
accord between Indonesia and Australia on the 
boundary. Yet so eager are the two sides to reach 
agreement that they have decided to go ahead, 
leaving unresolved the boundary 'dispute'. While 
engaging in lengthy dispute over the boundary, both 
governments ignore the fact that East Timor has the 
only legitimate claim to sovereignty over these 
territorial waters. 
Portuguese Government's warning 
Following the agreement, the Portuguese government 
announced its repudiation and re-affirmed its deter-
mination to use all legitimate means in reach to 
safeguard the rights of the East Timorese people. 
The agreement constitutes a clear and flagrant 
violation of international law and of the UN Charter 
and many resolutions of the General Assembly and the 
Security Council do not recognise Indonesia's sover-
eignty over East Timar, illegally occupied by military 
force since December 1975. 
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In protest, the Portuguese ambassador was recalled 
to Lisbon 'for consultations ' . The Portuguese govern-
ment is believed to be making preparations to chal-
lenge the Treaty's legality at the International Court 
of Justice. 
At a demons t ra tion against the Treaty in Canberra 
Jose Ramos Hor ta, former Fretilin representative in 
New York, criticised the h ypocrisy of the Hawke 
gov·ernment. "Gareth Evans and Bob Hawke have 
previously said that East Timor is too poor to suc-
cessfully achieve self-determination and yet they are 
now exploiting its natural resources which, according 
to the UN 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, is in East 
Timer 's exclusive economic zone." [Sydney Morning 
Herald, 7 December 1989] 
Parliamentarians protest 
At a press conference in Canberra, British and 
Australian parliamentarians spoke out against the 
Treaty. Lord Avebury, a leading campaigner for East 
\ .. --·~---­___...,,~~,.,.
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Sydney Morning Herald, 12 Deceaber 1989. [The two 
foreign ministers sensationalised the signing cere•ony 
by holding it on an aircraft above the 'Timor Gap'.] 
Timer's right to self-determination, speaking for the 
worldwide organisation, Parliamentarians for East 
Timor, said Indonesia was "not entitled to enter into 
treaties which purported to deal with seabed resour-
ces lying between a non-Indonesian territory and 
another sovereign state". The UN did not recognise 
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor; in a resolu-
tion in 1982, the General Assembly had called on the 
Secretary-General to consult with all interested 
parties to resolve the matter, he said. 
Another PET member, Australian MP Tony Lamb from 
the ruling Labour Party, reiterated Lord Avebury's 
condemnation and forecast a major row in party 
caucus when the Treaty came up for ratification in 
Parliament. The PET Forum in Australia has 40 mem-
bers, 36 of them on the government side, he said, who 
are unhappy with Australia's recognition of Indone-
sian sovereignty over East Timor. Australia's negotia-
tions with Indonesia were flawed in international law 
and against ALP policy, he said. [Canberra Times, 5 
January 1990J 
The Australian Parliament is likely to be asked to 
ratity the treaty in March or April this year, before 
Australian general elections due in May. 
Australian recognition and the oil factor 
The 'Timor Gap' Treaty divides the 60,000 square 
miles of sea into three areas; a southern sector, Zone 
B, where Australia will exercise exclusive rights, 
surrendering 16" of the Net Resources Rent Tax to 
Indonesia; a central sector, Zone A where exploitation 
will be managed by a Joint Authority of the two 
countries with revenues shared 50:50, and a northern 
sector, Zone C where Indonesia will exercise exclusive 
rights, surrendering 10% of its earnings to Australia. 
Until 1977, Australia refused to recognise Indone-
sia's annexation of East Timor. Then on 20 January 
1978, Canberra announced its acceptance of East 
Timor as part of Indonesia. While remaining critical of 
the way in which 'integration' had been brought 
about, it claimed that 'it would be unrealistic .to 
continue to refuse to recognise de facto that East 
Timar was a part of Indonesia'. In 1979, de facto 
recognition was replaced by de jure recognition. 
After five years of negotiations on oil reserves in 
East Timer's waters, the talks were still bogged down. 
Then Prime Minister Bob Hawke reiterated Australia's 
de jure recognition on 22 August 1985. This rather 
unusual re-statement of recognition reflected Austra-
lia's desire to reach agreement with Indonesia on the 
oil reserves. Hawke claimed that "negotiations over 
the Timor Gap seabed could in reality only take place 
with Indonesia". This was the price the Labour 
Government was prepared to pay, bartering East 
Timer's rights for exploitation of its oil. · 
Shortly before the Treaty was signed, Australia's 
Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, again tried 
to dispense with the awkward matter of East Timer's 
rights: 
We have taken the view since 1979 that whatever 
the unhspp,v circumstances and indeed, possible 
illegality, surrounding Indonesia's acquisition of East 
Timor in the 1970s, Indonesian sovereignt.v over the 
territory should be accepted not only on a de facto 
but on a de jure basis. There is no binding legal 
obligation not to recognise acquisition of territory 
that was acquired by force.[ Senate Dail.v Hansard, 1 
November 1989J 
For Australia, an oil bonanza 
Estimates of the value of 'Timor Gap' deposits vary, 
ranging from a billion barrels,L Financial Times, 14 
December 1989J to between 1 and 6 billion barrels of 
oil and between 3 and 17 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas reserves. l The Age, 9 September 19881 The area 
is considered to be one the world's 25 richest oil 
deposits. 
Australian petroleum companies are already ex-
ploiting oil in two off-shore fields, known as Challis 
and Jabiru, about 200 kilometres south-east of the 
area, where they are extracting about 60,000 barrels 
of oil a day, 10% of Australian production; reserves in 
these fields are put at about 125 million barrels. The 
companies have long been pressing the Hawke gov-
ernment for permission to carry out exploration and 
exploitation in the Timer Gap region. In 1983, when 
some Australian companies were close to succeeding, 
the Australian Defence Minister warned that such 
concessions would place heavy strains on the navy to 
defend these operations against Indonesian inter-
ference. Hence the need for agreement to be reached. 
Australian companies which have already invested 
millions of dollars on exploration in the area include 
a consortium of the Western Mining Corporation and 
Charterhall Oil and Woodside Petroleum. [Australian, 
12 December 1989.J Lobbying for concessions has also 
come from Pelsart Oil, Oil and Minerals Quest, Otter 
Exploration and Australian Aquitaine. l Financial Times, 
7 September 1988J Oil companies in other countries 
are also expected to bid for concessions. The Austra-
lian Minister for Resources, Peter Cook has said that 
he wants to invite bids from foreign as well as 
domestic companies. [Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 31 Janu-
ary 19891 
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For Indonesia, a diplomatic coup 
For Jakarta, the political significance of the treaty f£.r 
outweighs its economic significance. If the Treaty is 
allowed to stand, it will be the first international 
accord that formally legitimises Indonesia's annexation 
of East Timor. It will also provide an institutional 
basis to guarantee Australia's continuing commitment 
to and support for Jakarta's illegal annexation of East 
Timor. 
The Treaty is the climax of efforts by Jakarta and 
Canberra to improve relations between the two 
countries after years of strain and discord. Ties 
reached their lowest point in 1986 after an Australian 
newspaper published articles exposing the business 
activities of the Suharto family. This froze relations 
between Jakarta and Canberra. for more than a year. 
The Timar Gap agreement was reached after ten 
years of talks; the main stumbling block was the wide 
divergence of opinion between Indonesia and Austra-
lia over the seabed boundary. Indonesia holds by the 
principle of the 'median line' between countries which 
would set the boundary along the south of what is 
now established as Zone A. LSee diagramj As a sig-
natory of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (of 
which Australia is also a signatory), Indonesia knows 
that once the Convention becomes law which is likely 
in the next couple of years, it could also claim an area 
up to 200 miles from 'its' ie (East Timor's) coast which 
includes the whole of Zone B as well. Australia on the 
other hand stands by the continental shelf principle 
which would take the boundary much farther north, 
along the line representing the northern boundary of 
Zone c. This meant that the two negotiating teams 
held irreconcilable positions. 
In 1988, Indonesia ma.de an important concession, 
conceding that the 'disputed area' at present consists 
onlY of what is defined as Zone A. This was a major br~akthrough for Australia. In September 1988, an 
interim agreement was reached for a zone of coopera-
tion, making the present Treaty possible. 
Politically speaking, this represented a major shift 
in Indonesia's attitude towards its relations with 
Australia; Jakarta had until then allowed the bilateral 
relations to deteriorate to such an extent that no 
Australian journalists were permitted to work in 
Indonesia and no ministerial contacts were taking 
place. Scheduled talks about the Timor Gap were also 
cancelled. The shift reflects the diminished role of 
General Benny Murdani who, as armed forces com-
mander-in-chief until March 1988, had kept the 
relationship as such a low ebb. Mochtar Kusuma-
atmaja's replacement as Foreign Minister may also 
have helped remove the main obstacle to the accord 
as Mochtar was one of the leading architects of the 
UN Law of the Sea Convention and is likely to have 
been a hardliner on the boundary dispute keeping the 
two countries apart. 
The shift in Jakarta's position apparently took place 
on the instructions of President Suharto, recognising 
the political and strategic significance of a Treaty 
with Australia in Indonesia's long-running diplomatic 
battle to win international recognition for its annexa-
tion of East Timor. Indonesia may also hope that 
involvement of other foreign oil companies in the area 
will boost its claim to East Timor internationally. 
Indonesian critics 
In Indonesia, the Treaty has been sharply criticised 
by Professor Herman Johannes, a well-known acad-
emic formerly rector of Gadjah Mada University and 
I 'l one-time member of the Supreme Advisory Counc1. 
He argues that Indonesia has made unwarranted 
concessions on the boundary issue and describes the 
Treaty as 'extremely detrimental to Indonesia economi-
cally', His argument is that Zone B as well as Zone A 
EASTTIMOR 
is in disputed waters and the share-out here t_o<> 
should have been 50:50. He scorns the alleged benefits 
for Indonesia from a 90% aha.re of earnings from Zone 
C, insisting that the zone is devoid of oil reserves. 
Johannes' criticism and his demand that ~he In-
donesian parliament should refuse to ratify t~e 
treaty has come as something of an embarrassment m Jakar~. It forced members of the Indonesian tea~ .to 
acknowledge that even if the treaty is not benef1c1~l 
economically, it is of great political and strategic 
significance. lKompas, 6 March 1989j Needless to say, 
no-one in Indonesia has dared criticise the Treaty for 
violating East Timor's sovereignty over the area. 
Australian hypocrisy 
Discussion of the Treaty in the Australian press has 
concentrated primarily on the economic benefits 
accruing to the country's petroleum industry. The 
Canberra Times l12 December 1989j showed some 
surprise that "Australia was even prepared to do a 
deal with Indonesia over an oil-rich piece of seabed 
which many people believe rightly belongs to neither 
country but to the unrecognised people of East 
Timor". But while admitting that Indonesia's annexa-
tion of East Timor was "deplorable", the paper argues 
that it cannot be undone. "The best that can happen 
is for Australia to get itself into a position where it 
can influence Indonesia so its administration in East 
Timor behaves with more sensitivity ... even if it never 
accedes to one of the basic human rights - self-
determination." The paper then alleges that by 
sharing the administration as well as the profits from 
the oil, the two countries will "get a greater under-
standing of the way each other's governance works. 
This however slightly, will do more for self-deter-
mina'tion and freedom in East Timor than the previous 
stand-off which achieved exactly nothing." 
The depths to which Australian government hypocri-
sy has fallen over the Treaty is revealed in a letter 
to TAPOL from the Australian Foreign Affairs Depart-
ment, in response to our protest against the Treaty 
as a violation of international law. It quoted a state-
ment by Senator Gareth Evans, then Minister for 
Resources and Energy, in March 1986: 
It is perfectly consistent with Australia. 's recogni-
tion of Indonesia's sovereignty over Ea.st Timor to 
enga.ge in negotiations with Indonesia now on the 
Timar ga.p. To engage in such negotiations does not as 
a matter of international law ma.ke Australia. a party to 
the initial acquisition by Indonesia of East Timor any 
more than Australia's dealings with other sovereign 
states make Australia a party to the means they used 
to acquire territory in the first place; nor does it 
affect the legality of the negotiations; nor does it 
signify approval of the original acquisition of the 
territor.v. 
This is a circuitous argument. The reason for 
Canberra's de jure recognition in the first place was 
to legitimise negotiations with Indonesia about East 
Timor's oil. 
campaigning 
This grave injustice to the people of East Timar needs 
to be opposed wherever possible. Readers wishing to 
support a campaign against the Timar Gap Treaty 
should protest to the Australian government, either 
directly or through the Australian embassy in their 
country. They should also urge the Portuguese 
government to ask the International Court of Justice 
to make a judgement on the Treaty under internation-
al law. iC 
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MUSLIM TRIALS 
More Muslim trials on the way 
There is no end in sight yet for the Muslim trials 
under way in Lampung, Jakarta and Bima, East 
Nusatenggara. The trials are all in some way related 
to the so-called Warsidi group whose village, Talang-
sari, was assaulted by army troops in February 1989, 
· with heavy loss of life. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 92, 
April 1989 and No. 96, December 19891 
After the first group of six trials in Lampung had 
finished, with five defendants getting life imprison-
ment and one, 20 years, a second wave began, with 
eight people in the dock. Seven of the trials have 
been completed, with all receiving severe sentences. 
Three of the accused, Fachruddin, Marsudi and 
Riyanto were given life sentences, while Abadi Abdul-
lah and Musonif were sentenced to 20 years. The 
youngest of the defendants, 16-year old Tardi Nur-
diyansyah, got 17 years while Arifin bin Karyan was 
sentenced to 15 years. The trial of the eighth defen-
dant in this group, Mulyadi bin Jaime, is still in 
progress. 
Now another eight Muslim activists are due to go on 
trial in Lampung, beginning with Zainal Arifin bin 
Thoyib, age 53 years. This group is said to have set 
up a 'shadow province' with Zainal Arifin as its 
'shadow governor'. They are described as a 'more 
moderate group', believing in 'evolutionary tactics' as 
distinct from the Warsidi group which was committed 
to 'revolutionary tactics', to attain their objectives 
more quickly, even if it meant using violent means. 
lKompas, 18 January 19901 
So far, only one of the seven trials under way in 
Jakarta has ended. Dede Syaifuddin was sentenced to 
7 years. Judging by the sentences demanded by the 
prosecution, there are likely to be some very stiff 
sentences. The prosecution wants Nur Hidayat and 
Achmad Fauzie to get life sentences, while the pro.sec-
ution demands for the other four range from 15 to 20 
years. 
Continued from page 7. 
local military commands, civil administration officials 
and the police without the person's knowledge; this is 
an important part of what Indonesia's security 
officials call the 'Mental and Ideology Screening 
Process'. The D-envelope contains a number of forms 
that must all be completed, asking questions about the 
individual's family and in-laws for several generations 
and her/his party and organisational affiliation before 
and after 1965. 
An 'unclean' record in someone's D-envelope makes 
it impossible for the person to enter the armed forces 
or to obtain employment in many government offices 
and local administrations. This system has been in 
operation since 1980 based on instructions issued by 
the army security command, Kopkamtib. 
This insidious method of bio-data control came to 
light recently, not because of concern about the 
blatant political discrimination but because some 
members of parliament had been told that army 
personnel were charging levies for these documents, 
making profits from a 'service' that is supposed to be 
free of charge. This was strongly denied by Major-
General Sugeng Subroto, military commander of East 
Timor, dismissing the claim that because of such 
'commercial practices', many former communist mem-
bers had slipped through the net. [Tempo, 2 December 
1989] 
'Lighter• sentences in Bi.ma 
In Bima, the sentences have been somewhat lighter, 
with 6 years for Achmad Husen, six and a half years 
for his 65-year-old brother, Moh Nur Husen, 9 years 
for Zainul Arifin, and 11 years for the 64-year old 
H.A. Ghany Masykur. 
Blind preacher arrested 
Meanwhile a blind Muslim preacher, whose name first 
cropped up in 1985 when Muslims were being arrested 
for a wave of bombings in Central and East Java, has 
now been arrested in Bandung, along with his escort. 
He is Husein Ali Al-Habsyi, the brother of Abdul Kadir 
Ali Al-Habsyi, who was sentenced to 20 years in 1986 
for alleged involvement in several bombing incidents, 
including one which destroyed several stupas of the 
Borobudur Buddhist complex in Central Java. He is 
said to have been found in possession of leaflets 
containing 'false information' about poisoned biscuits. 
[Jakarta Post, 6 January 1990J According to Editor. 
however, the leaflets referred to the mob violence 
against women wearing headscarves who were picked 
on, with not a shred of evidence, as the ones who 
were distributing poisoned biscuits. Husein is ap-
parently believed to . have links with many Muslim 
groups in Central and East Java, suspected of trying 
to replace the present state with a state based on 
Islam. l Editor, 13 January] By all accounts, his arrest 
will give a new lease of life to the anti-Muslim crus-
ade, with yet more trials still to come. .... 
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